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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is a negligence action arising out of plaintiff-appellant Amey Nelson's ("Nelson")
use of gym equipment during a new circuit training class that defendant Anytime Fitness ("AT
Fitness") was offering to its members. AT Fitness hired defendant-respondent Stefani Kaufman
("Kaufman") to teach its new circuit training class. While participating in the circuit training
class, Nelson's hand slipped off one of the weight machines and was injured. As a result of the
injury she sustained in the circuit training class, Nelson brought this negligence action against
defendants AT Fitness and Kaufman. The district court granted both AT Fitness's and
Kaufman's respective motions for summary judgment on the grounds that Nelson's gym
membership agreement released AT Fitness and Kaufman, in her capacity as an agent of AT
Fitness, from liability. Specifically, the district court determined that Kaufman was acting as an
agent of AT Fitness when the incident occurred through both express authority and apparent
authority and was therefore released from liability under the plain language of Nelson's
membership agreement.
Nelson appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her
complaint against Kaufman with prejudice.

B.

Statement of Facts

Kaufman disagrees with the following facts set forth in Nelson's Appellant's brief as they
are improperly characterized and/or are incorrect:
4.

The principal here, Anytime Fitness, has stated that Defendant was never
an agent or employee of Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness, LLC. (R., pp. 631

64, L. 4, 1-3 [citing Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, <JI 2]).
5.

The principal here, Anytime Fitness has stated in an affidavit that
Defendant was an independent contractor to Anytime Fitness. (R., p. 64,
L. 6-7 1 [sic]).

6.

The principal here, Anytime Fitness has stated in an affidavit that
Defendant was paid as an independent contractor, for one task, by
Anytime Fitness. (R., p. 64, L. 6-7 2 [sic])

(Appellant's Brief, p. 5.) Nelson's contention that Anytime Fitness stated Kaufman was never an
agent of Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness, LLC is incorrect because Anytime Fitness made no
statement as to whether Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness. (See, Aug. R. p. 2,

<JI

7.)

Paragraphs 5 and 6 refer to the affidavit submitted by Anytime Fitness in support of its motion
for summary judgment but incorrectly cite to Kaufman's affidavit submitted in support of her
motion for summary judgment.
Moreover, in the introduction section of Nelson's Appellant's brief, she states that the
affidavit submitted by AT Fitness in support of its motion for summary judgment provides that it
"was not liable for the actions of Stefani Kaufman because she was not an agent and that she was
an independent contractor." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) This is incorrect. The Affidavit of Tayson
Webb submitted in support of AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment states that Kaufman

This citation relates to the Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, not the affidavit submitted by Anytime Fitness in support of its motion for summary
judgment.
1

2

See footnote 2, supra.

2

was an independent contractor, but makes no reference to whether Kaufman was an agent of AT
Fitness at the time of the incident. (Aug. R. p. 2, <JI 7 3.)
Kaufman adds the following facts:
On January 29, 2014, Nelson signed an Anytime Fitness Membership Agreement with
AT Fitness ("Membership Agreement"). (Aug. R. pp. 5-6.) The Membership Agreement also
contained a release of liability and assumptions of risk agreement ("Release Agreement"). (Id.)
The relevant parts of the Release Agreement provide as follows:
I understand the risk of injury from CLUB activities and using any CLUB
equipment is significant, including the potential for permanent paralysis and
death, I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS, both
known and unknown. I acknowledge that this is an UNSUPERVISED FITNESS
CENTER and I assume all risks associated with using exercise equipment and
other products and machines and exercising alone without the aid and presence of
CLUB staff on the premises ... I HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND
HOLD HARMLESS Anytime Fitness, LLC and its affiliates, ABC Financial
Services, INC., AND THE OWNERS OF ALL CLUBS WITHIN THE
ANYTIME FITNESS SYSTEM, as well as all sponsors and advertisers, and all
owners and lessors of the premises of such clubs, and their respective officers,
affiliates, agents and employees WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL INJURY,
DISABILITY, DEATH, LOSS OR DAMAGE to person or property that may
arise out of or in connection with my use of any of the equipment products and
machines or the facilities of the CLUB of any other Anytime Fitness club, or any
incident that occurs while using such facilities, or otherwise related to my
membership.
I expressly agree that this release is intended to be as broad and inclusive as
permitted by applicable law and if a portion of this release is held invalid, the
balance shall remain in full force and effect. This release shall apply to my heirs,

Paragraph 7 of Tayson Webb's Affidavit provides: "That on the date of the subject accident
Stefani Kaufman was an independent contractor trainer offering services at AT Fitness, LLC' s
club." (Aug. R. p. 2, <JI 7.)
3

3

assigns, personal representatives and any other next of kin. I understand that the
CLUB is relying on this release in agreeing to enter into this Agreement.
I HA VE READ THE RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND ASSUMPTIONS OF
RISK AGREEMENT, FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS AND THAT I
HA VE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND SIGN IT
FREELY VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY INDUCEMENT.
(Id.) (Underline added).

While using AT Fitness's facilities, Nelson noticed an advertisement for a new AT
Fitness circuit training class. (Augmented R. p. 1, 12, Affidavit of Amey J. Nelson.) AT Fitness
offered to its members its new circuit training class at no additional cost. (Id., p. 2,

1 3.) The

advertisement also stated that the circuit training class would be taught by a trainer selected by
AT Fitness. (Id.) Moreover, the advertisement included Kaufman's picture, stating that Kaufman
"was a personal trainer at Anytime Fitness." (Id., 14.)
AT Fitness hired Kaufman to teach its new circuit training class. (Id., 11 3-5; R. pp. 6364, 12.) AT Fitness scheduled the dates and times the circuit training class would be held. (R. p.
64,

1 3.) AT Fitness paid Kaufman to teach the circuit class that Nelson attended in March of

2014. (Id., 14.) Nelson believed Kaufman "was working for Anytime Fitness, as she was the one
teaching their class, for the purpose of familiarizing members of Anytime Fitness with the new
Anytime Fitness Equipment." (Augmented R. p. 3, 124.)
On March 24, 2014, while participating in the AT Fitness circuit training class, Nelson
was using a triceps weight machine when her left hand slipped off the machine's handle and
struck the machine. (Id.,

1 21.) Nelson fractured a metatarsal bone in her left hand when she

struck the machine. (Id.)

4

C.

Course of Proceedings

Nelson failed to provide a Course of Proceedings. Kaufman offers the following:
On March 24, 2016, Nelson filed her Verified Complaint for Damages and Demand for
Jury Trial ("Complaint"), in which she asserted a single negligence cause of action against both
AT Fitness and Kaufman related to the injury she sustained to her hand while participating in an
AT Fitness circuit training class. (R. pp. 9-16.) On May 2, 2016, AT Fitness filed its Answer to
the Complaint. (R. pp. 17-21.)
On April 19, 2017, AT Fitness filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Nelson's Complaint was barred because she expressly contracted to assume the risk of using AT
Fitness's facilities and equipment. (R. pp. 22-27.) AT Fitness also argued that Nelson could not
demonstrate that any alleged instruction by Kaufman regarding the triceps machine was
improper, a breach of duty, or the proximate cause of Nelson's injuries. (R. p. 29.) When AT
Fitness filed its motion for summary judgment, Kaufman had not made an appearance in this
case4 • In opposition to AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment, Nelson argued that
"Kaufman supervised and instructed her regarding equipment use and the membership
agreement does not, therefore, waive Defendants' liability." (R. p. 26.) In fact, Nelson argued
that at the time of the underlying incident, Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness: "Under the law
of Idaho, there is evidence that Stefani Kaufman was acting with either express, implied or

Service of the Complaint and summons upon Kaufman was done by publication because
Kaufman had moved to New Mexico. See Register of Action Report within the Clerk's Record.
(R. p. 2.)

4
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apparent authority of Anytime Fitness and AT Fitness, LLC. The manager of AT Fitness made it
appear that Stefani Kaufman was one of the club staff, a teacher of a class at the club." (See
pending Motion to Augment, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, p.
5.)

On June 30, 2017, the District Court granted AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed Nelson's Complaint for the following reasons: (1) the plain language of the
Release Agreement established that Nelson released AT Fitness from liability, and (2) Nelson
failed to provide any evidence as to the breach of duty element of her negligence claim. (R. pp.
29-31.)
On July 28, 2017, Kaufman filed her answer to Nelson's Complaint. (R. pp. 33-38.)
On August 3, 2017, the District Court entered a judgment with respect to AT Fitness's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Nelson's claims against AT Fitness with prejudice.

(Id., pp. 39-40.) Nelson has not appealed from this grant of summary judgment or AT Fitness's
dismissal. See Appellant's Brief, p. 7 ("This Appeal is not from that judgment.")
On September 11, 2017, Kaufman filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting
memorandum and affidavits of counsel and Kaufman. (R. pp. 41-56 and pp. 63-65.) The basis for
Kaufman's motion was that she was an agent of AT Fitness at the time of the incident and
therefore, under the plain language of the Release Agreement, Nelson also released Kaufman
from liability. (R. pp. 46-56.) On October 19, 2017, Nelson filed a brief in opposition to
Kaufman's motion for summary judgment, in which she reversed course from her prior
arguments in opposition to AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment, and argued that at the

6

time of the incident, Kaufman was not an agent of AT Fitness. (R. pp. 66-78.) In support of her
opposition, Nelson filed an affidavit of a personal trainer, Affidavit of Kaecee Reed, which
attached three exhibits. (R. 79-80.) The exhibits were neither authenticated by the affiant, nor
were they even mentioned in the affidavit. (Id.) As such, on October 26, 2017, Kaufman filed a
motion to strike the exhibits attached to Reed's affidavit and those statements in Nelson's brief
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment supported by Reed's affidavit or the
attachments. (R. pp. 92-93.)
On October 27, 2017, Nelson filed a Second Affidavit of Kaecee Reed, which attempted
to correct the mistakes associated with Reed's original affidavit. (R. pp. 81-82.) On October 30,
2017, Kaufman filed a motion to strike the second affidavit of Kaecee Reed on the grounds that
it was untimely, contained incorrect information, and merely contained conclusory statements
that lacked foundation and/or were hearsay. (R. pp. 99-106.)
On November 2, 2017, a hearing on Kaufman's motion for summary judgment and the
motions to strike was held and the District Court heard each parties' respective arguments related
to the motions. (R. pp. 7 and 136; Tr. pp. 5-52.) At the November 2, 2017, hearing, Nelson's
counsel withdrew the three exhibits that were attached to Kaecee Reed's affidavit. (Tr. p. 28, 11.
16-23.) The District Court granted Kaufman's motion for summary judgment from the bench and
found:

7

Based upon the undisputed evidence5 offered by Nelson, a question of [fact] does
not exist that Anytime Fitness authorized Kaufman to act on its behalf to conduct
the circuit training class and train members how to use its exercise equipment.
Anytime Fitness granted Kaufman with the actual authority to conduct the class.
Similarly, a question of fact does not exist that Anytime Fitness vested Kaufman
with apparent authority to act on its behalf in teaching the circuit training class.
(Tr. p. 49, 11. 5-14)
Kaufman possessed both actual and apparent authority from Anytime Fitness to
conduct the circuit training class at Anytime Fitness' facility.
(Id., p. 51, 11. 2-4.)

In granting Kaufman's motion, the District Court determined that Kaufman had
actual/express authority to act as AT Fitness's agent. (Id., p. 51, 11. 2-4; R. pp. 140-41.)
Additionally, the District Court also determined that AT Fitness granted Kaufman apparent
authority to act as its agent in teaching AT Fitness's circuit training class. (Id.)
On November 17, 2017, Nelson filed a motion to reconsider arguing that the Release
Agreement did not apply to Kaufman because Kaufman was an independent contractor and not
an employee or agent of AT Fitness. (R. pp. 107-115.)
On November 28, 2017, the District Court issued an order granting Kaufman's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice against Kaufman. (R. pp.
116-17.) Judgment was entered that same day. (R. p. 118.)

5

See, Tr. pp. 48-49, 11. 11-4.
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On March 6, 2018, the District Court issued its Bench Memorandum Re: Kaufman's [sic]
Motion to Reconsider ("Bench Memorandum"), in which it analyzed whether Nelson's motion to

reconsider should be granted and concluded that the motion to reconsider should be denied. (R.
pp. 134-142.) Specifically, the District Court held: (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact
that Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness; (2) even if Kaufman were an independent contractor
of AT Fitness at the time of the incident, it would not be determinative of her status as an agent;
(3) under the plain language of the Membership Agreement, Nelson released agents of AT

Fitness from liability; and (4) because the facts upon which the District Court relied to determine
the existence of an agency relationship between Kaufman and AT Fitness were not disputed, the
determination of agency was a question of law for the District Court to decide. (R. pp. 136-142.)
On March 15, 2018, the District Court issued an order denying Nelson's motion to reconsider.
(R. pp. 143-44.)

On April 24, 2018, Nelson timely filed a notice of appeal and identified the issue on
appeal as follows: " ... that summary judgment was erroneously granted where facts supported the
Plaintiff's case, summary judgment was granted prematurely, the burden of proof was
erroneously shifted to Plaintiff, and evidence was erroneously construed in favor of the moving
party." (R. p. 145; see also, Appellant's Brief, p. 4.)

II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Issues on Appeal
Appellant did not provide any issues on appeal. Under "Summary of the Argument,"

Appellant provides the following headings:

9

1. The Court erred in finding that Defendant was not an Independent Contractor.
2. Apparent authority does not protect Defendant.
3. The Court erred by making a finding that an agency relationship existed when it had
no power to do so.
4. The Court erred by construing facts in the light most favorable to the moving party.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.)
B.

Additional Issue on Appeal

1. Whether the Court Can Affirm the Grant of Summary Judgment to Kaufman Based
on Nelson's Failure to Contest the District Court's Alternative, Independent Grounds
for Granting Summary Judgment that Kaufman has Express Authority to Act as AT
Fitness's Agent.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court "uses the same standard properly employed by the district court originally
ruling on the motion." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 589, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001) (citation
omitted). "The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
I.R.C.P. 56(a). "The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact
exist. Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
This Court freely reviews issues of law." Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 324, 256 P.3d 730,
732 (201 l)(citations omitted).
"If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which

this Court exercises free review." Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864
(2007). "In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make

10

a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 259-60,
245 P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (2011) (quoting Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127
(1988)).
Additionally, when a district court grants summary judgment on multiple independent
grounds, the appellant must successfully challenge all of those grounds to prevail on appeal. See,
e.g., Lee v. Litster, 161 Idaho 546, 549, 388 P.3d 61, 64 (2017); see also In Re Contest of
Election (primary election-Republican nomination) for State Representative in Legislative Dist.
No. 7, Position "B", 164 Idaho 102,425 P.3d 1245, 1251-52 (2018) ("Regardless of whether an

issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only
mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be
considered by this Court.").

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to Kaufman Should be Affirmed
Because Nelson Failed to Contest the District Court's Independent Grounds for
Granting Summary Judgment.
Nelson makes the following arguments on appeal, all of which relate to the District

Court's findings regarding apparent authority and Kaufman's status as an agent: (1) "The Court
erred in finding that Defendant was not an independent contractor"; (2) "Apparent authority does
not protect Defendant"; (3) "The Court erred by making a finding that and [sic] agency
relationship existed when it had no power to do so"; and (4) "The Court erred by construing facts
in a light most favorable to the moving party." (Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) However, Nelson did

11

not challenge and has provided no argument or authority regarding the District Court's
alternative, independent finding that Kaufman had actual/express authority to act as AT Fitness's
agent. Moreover, Nelson did not appeal the District Court's findings that the plain language of
Nelson's Membership Agreement with AT Fitness contains a general waiver of liability for
agents of AT Fitness. (Tr. p. 51, 11. 5-13, " ... Does the release agreement bar Nelson's claim
against Kaufman? Under the plain language of the membership agreement, Nelson waived
liability on behalf of Anytime Fitness and its agents. Therefore, as a matter of law, Nelson's
claim against Kaufman is barred. Kaufman's motion for summary judgment should be granted,
and the complaint against Kaufman should be dismissed"; Tr. p. 74, 11. 20-22, "B, the
membership agreement is a valid contract under which Nelson waived liability of Anytime
Fitness agents. And this is addressed in previous decision by the Court."; see also R. p. 138,
"Under the plain language of the membership agreement, Nelson waived the liability of Anytime
Fitness's agents.")
Under Idaho law, "if an appellant fails to contest all of the grounds upon which a district
court based its grant of summary judgment, the judgment must be affirmed." Lee, 161 Idaho at
550, 388 P.3d at 65 (citing AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 164, 307 P.3d
176, 181 (2013)); see also Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 524,
272, P.3d 491,496 (2012).
In Weisel, the plaintiff sought to rescind a contract on the ground of mutual mistake. Id.
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on two alternative grounds;
first, no genuine issue of material fact existed to support a finding that the contract was based on

12

a mutual mistake of fact and therefore the claim was without merit, and second, that the mutual
mistake claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 525, 272 P.3d at 497. On appeal,
Weisel's initial appellate brief did not challenge the district court's conclusion that the statute of
limitations required dismissal of the mutual mistake claim. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that because Weisel failed to adequately raise the statute of limitations issue in his initial
appellate brief, he waived the matter on appeal. Id. at 525-26, 272 P.3d at 497-98 ("an
appellant's failure to address an independent ground for a grant of summary judgment is fatal to
the appeal.") (citation omitted). Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to consider the
independent ground for the grant of summary judgment.
The District Court granted Kaufman's motion for summary judgment on two independent
grounds: (1) the undisputed evidence established that Kaufman had actual/express authority to
act as AT Fitness's agent (Tr. p. 49, 11. 5-11; R. p. 140-41); and (2) alternatively, even assuming
the undisputed facts did not support a finding that AT Fitness granted Kaufman express
authority, AT Fitness granted Kaufman apparent authority to act as its agent in teaching the
circuit training class in which Nelson injured her hand. (Tr. p. 49, 11. 12-14; R. p. 140-41.) On
appeal, Nelson does not contest the District Court's holding that Kaufman had actual/express
authority to act as AT Fitness's agent.
Nelson's failure to address the District Court's holding that Kaufman was an agent of AT
Fitness through a grant of express authority is fatal to the appeal because the plain language of
the Membership Agreement signed by Nelson contains a general waiver of liability of all agents

13

of AT Fitness with respect to all injuries to any person arising out of use of any equipment or the
AT Fitness facility. (Aug. R. pp. 5-6.) 6
"If an appellant fails to contest all of the grounds upon which a district court based its

grant of summary judgment, the judgment must be affirmed." See, e.g., Cuevas v. Barraza, 155
Idaho 962,965,318 P.3d 952,955 (2014) (quotingAED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159,
164, 307 P.3d 176, 181 (2013); see also, Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision
Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., No. 45390, 2018 WL 6188276, at *4 (Idaho Nov. 28, 2018)). Because

Nelson did not challenge the District Court's ruling pertaining to Kaufman's status as an agent
through express authority, this Court should affirm the District Court's rulings that Kaufman is
an agent and agents are covered by the release of liability in the Membership Agreement. The
appeal should be dismissed on this ground alone.

B.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on the Ground that
Kaufman Was an Agent of AT Fitness Through Apparent Authority and was
Therefore Released from Liability Under the Membership Agreement.
Alternatively, if this Court does not affirm the judgment dismissing the Complaint

against Kaufman based on Nelson's failure to contest on appeal the District Court's independent
ground for dismissing the Complaint, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to
Kaufman can be affirmed on the grounds that Kaufman was AT Fitness's agent through apparent
authority and covered by the release of liability in the Membership Agreement.

Nelson has not appealed the District Court's finding that the plain language of the Membership
Agreement is a general waiver of liability of all agents.

6
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1.

The District Court Did Not Find That Kaufman was Not an Independent
Contractor.

Nelson contends that the District Court erred in finding that Kaufman was not an
independent contractor. (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) The District Court made no finding regarding
Kaufman's status as an independent contractor and did not rule that she was not an independent
contractor. The District Court ruled instead that it does not matter whether Kaufman is an
independent contractor, the material issue is whether she is an agent and her status as one is not
determinative of her status as the other. (R. pp. 137-138; Tr. p. 73-74, 11. 16-19.) Specifically,
the District Court stated:
She argues Kaufman was an independent contractor and, therefore, the
membership agreement's waiver of liability does not apply.

a. Independent contractor status does not preclude a finding of agency.
Nelson argues, "the owner of the company clearly stated in a sworn affidavit that
[Kaufman] was an independent contractor and was never an agent or employee of
Anytime Fitness."' P's Br. at 4 (citing Webb Aff. <[ 7). Nelson's argument appears
to be that an individual cannot simultaneously be an independent contractor and
an agent. Nelson believes that if there is a question of fact regarding Kaufman's
status as an independent contractor, then there must likewise be a question of fact
regarding Kaufman's status as an agent of Anytime Fitness.
Nelson's premise is faulty. "An independent contractor may or may not be an
agent, and serving concurrently as an agent and as an independent contractor is
not mutually exclusive." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractors § 2 (notes
omitted).
An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical
While the Webb Affidavit states that Kaufman was an independent contractor,
Webb does not make any mention of Kaufman's status as an agent.
1
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conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not
be an agent.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(3) (1958) (emphasis added). See also Jones
v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 113, 206 P.3d 473, 477
(2009) (finding a hospital may be held liable for the actions of an independent
contractor vested with apparent authority).
Whether or not Kaufman is an independent contractor does not determine the
question of whether she was Anytime Fitness's agent. Even if Kaufman were an
independent contractor, it would not determine her status as an agent.
(R. pp. 137-138.) (Italics in original). The District Court did not commit error in finding that

Kaufman was not an independent contractor because it made no such finding. The District Court
found that it did not matter whether she was an independent contractor because even if she was
that does not determine whether the Membership Agreement's waiver of liability applies. Rather,
the issue is whether she was an agent and the court correctly determined she was, both through
express and apparent authority.

2.

The District Court Did Not Err When it Found Kaufman was an Agent
Through Apparent Authority.

"An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a principal towards the
performance of a specific task or series of tasks." Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366
P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016), reh'g denied (Feb. 23, 2016). "An agency relationship is created
through the actions of the principal who either: (1) expressly grants the agent authority to
conduct certain actions on his or her behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct
certain actions which are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or
(3) apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party indicating
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that express or implied authority has been granted." Humphries, 159 Idaho at 735, 366 P.3d at
1095.
As referenced above, "express authority" refers to the authority a principal has explicitly
granted the agent to act in the principal's name. American West Enter., Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155
Idaho 746, 753, 316 P.3d 662, 669 (2013). "Implied authority refers to that authority which is
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to the
agent by the principal." Id. Finally, apparent authority "is created when the principal voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the
business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is
acting pursuant to existing authority." Id.
The doctrine of apparent authority has two essential elements: (1) conduct by the
principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the
principal's behalf; and (2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is
rendered on behalf of the principal. Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 133,
384 P.3d 374, 380 (2016).
In this case, AT Fitness's conduct satisfies the first element of the doctrine of apparent
authority: (1) AT Fitness hired Kaufman to teach the circuit training class (R. pp. 63-4, <J[ 2.); (2)
AT Fitness's advertisement for the circuit training class had a picture of Kaufman on it and
indicated that Kaufman was an AT Fitness employee (Augmented R. pp. 2-3, <j[<j[ 4, 22, 24); (3)
AT Fitness paid Kaufman to be the instructor of AT Fitness's circuit training class (R. p. 64, <JI 4;
Augmented R. p. 4,

<JI

25); and (4) AT Fitness scheduled the times, dates, and location where the
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circuit training class would be offered, and therefore, controlled when Kaufman would be AT
Fitness's circuit training class instructor. (R. pp. 63-4, <J[<J[ 2-3.) These facts are undisputed.
The second element is established by the following: ( 1) Nelson accepted Kaufman as the
AT Fitness instructor for the circuit training class (Augmented R. p. 3, <J[<J[ 22, 24); and (2) Nelson
reasonably believed Kaufman was teaching the circuit training class on behalf of AT Fitness.
(Id.) These facts are undisputed. Therefore, the District Court properly determined, as a matter of

law, that the given set of facts was sufficient to constitute an agency relationship between
Kaufman and AT Fitness at the time of the incident because AT Fitness provided her with
apparent authority to act on its behalf (Tr. p. 49, 11. 5-14.)
Nelson's contention that the District Court erred because it had no power to make a
finding that an apparent agency relationship existed is incorrect and is contrary to well-settled
Idaho law. (Appellant's Brief, p. 16.) Whether facts sufficient to constitute an agency
relationship exist is a question of fact for the jury; however, whether a given set of facts are
sufficient to constitute an agency relationship is a question of law. Humphries, 159 Idaho at 735,
366 P.3d at 1095; American West, 155 Idaho at 753, 316 P.3d at 669 (stating the existence of an
agency relationship becomes a question of law where the question depends on the construction of
a legal instrument). Here, the quantum of evidence (facts) was not disputed, nor were the facts
themselves. The District Court correctly ruled, under the second prong that the undisputed facts
constituted an apparent agency relationship, which is a question of law.
Based on the uncontroverted evidence relied upon by the District Court when it decided
Kaufman's motion for summary judgment, AT Fitness's words and conduct that were directed
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towards its members, including Nelson, establish that it provided Kaufman with apparent
authority. Significantly, it is undisputed that Nelson reasonably believed that Kaufman had the
authority to act on behalf of AT Fitness while she taught the circuit training class. (Augmented
R. p. 3,

<JI

22, "With the ad for the class being immediately next to the manager's office, and the

manager having identified Stefani Kaufman as the teacher of that class, and directing me to wait
for her, by all appearances it was a class advertised and taught at Anytime Fitness by someone
working for Anytime Fitness."; R. p. 3,
contractor."; R. p. 3,

<JI

<JI

23, "No one told me Stefani was an "independent

24, "I believed Stefanie Kaufman was working for Anytime Fitness, as

she was the one teaching their class, for the purpose of familiarizing members of Anytime
Fitness with the new Anytime Fitness equipment."; see also Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure

Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 116, 206 P.3d 473, 480 (2009) (stating a third party who asserts
apparent authority is required to prove a reasonable belief that the actor had authority to act on
behalf of the principal that is traceable to the principal' s manifestations to the third-party7).

3.

The District Court Did Not Erroneously Use Apparent Authority to Shield
Kaufman From Liability.

Apparent authority was not used as a shield to escape liability. Apparent authority was
used to establish the relationships between AT Fitness and Kaufman.

It is the Membership

Agreement, signed by Nelson and found by the District Court to unambiguously release from
liability all agents, that "shielded" Kaufman from liability.

7

In Jones, the third party asserting apparent authority was the plaintiff.
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4.

The District Court Did Not Err by Construing the Facts in Favor of the
Moving Party.

Nelson contends that the District Court erred by "construing the facts in the light most
favorable to the moving party." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 17 and 19.) Nelson further contends, "[i]n
making its erroneous findings, the [District] Court disregarded the evidence presented to it
through affidavit and record, and instead adopted the facts that [Kaufman] asserted as argument
with no evidence, testimony, or affidavit to allow it to be admitted into the Court." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 19.) Nelson's contentions are misguided. (See Tr. p. 45, 11. 15-23 and pp. 48-49, 11. 11-4
(District Court's statements setting forth the applicable standard of review when assessing facts
and evidence before ruling on a motion for summary judgment.)
The District Court's Bench Memorandum sets forth the applicable standard of review as
follows: "When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party." (R. p. 135) (citing Dodge-Farrar v.
American Cleaning Services, Co., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002)). Additionally,
the facts relied upon by the District Court in finding an agency relationship existed between
Kaufman and AT Fitness were not disputed. (Tr. pp. 48-49, 11. 11-4; R. p. 139, "The facts upon
which this Court relied to determine the existence of an agency relationship between Kaufman
and Anytime Fitness were not disputed."; see also R. p. 142, "The undisputed facts establish
Kaufman was an agent of Anytime Fitness in the capacity of a class instructor.")
Because the facts that the District Court relied upon in concluding that Kaufman had
express and/or apparent authority to act as AT Fitness's agent were not disputed, the
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determination of agency was a question of law for the District Court to decide. See, e.g., Forbush

v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 396 P.3d 1199, 1212
(2017). The District Court properly determined that the undisputed facts established an agency
relationship between Kaufman and AT Fitness.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Kaufman respectfully requests that the Court affirm the District
Court's grant of summary judgment to Kaufman and dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice.

DATED this

_j[ day of January, 2019.

By
J
A. Thomson - Of the Firm
/os~h F. Southers - Of the Firm
/fr(torneys for Defendant-Respondent

I
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